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The Australian Financial Services Reform Act (2001) now requires all 
registered financial planners to assess a client’s attitude towards 
investment risk as an integral part of establishing a ‘reasonable’ basis 
for investment advice to a client. However, the Act is silent on required 
procedures or acceptable minimum standards of risk assessment. 
Unfortunately, current methods for assessing a client’s attitudes 
towards investment risk are mostly informal, untested and ignore such 
behavioral biases as framing and other response anomalies. Unless 
controlled for, these anomalies can invert risk attitude responses and 
invalidate portfolio choices recommended to the client on the basis of 
this risk attitude assessment. This paper examines the potential effects 
of question framing on risk attitude assessments by financial planners 
and explores the implications for matching risk attitudes to 
standardized portfolio categories. Minimum industry standards are 
recommended as a way to deal with such behavioral issues in risk 
attitude assessment.   
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The Financial Services Reform Act {Commonwealth of Australia, 2001} now 
requires financial planners in Australia to assess a client’s investment risk attitudes or 
‘risk profile’ when   identifying a client’s financial objectives, situation and needs as 
the ‘reasonable’ basis for subsequent investment advice. But the Act is silent on the 
actual process of risk profiling, except for ‘reasonable enquiries’ based on client 
provided data. This lack of guidance creates potential legal, fiduciary and procedural 
problems for financial planners. If the Act merely refers to evidence of an attempt to 
establish a client’s investment risk profile, then compliance is merely a matter of 
documentary evidence. But if the Act implies a ‘reasonable’ level of professional 
skill, competence and validity in the process, then the matter is potentially more 
serious; especially since most current assessment techniques used by financial 
planners are informal question and answer processes of doubtful validity, both in 
terms of psychometric principles and investment theory.  
One critical class of behavioral problem in risk attitude assessment is that of 
‘framing’. Data collection always involves a method of ‘framing’ the questions, either 
verbal or written, to elicit responses from the client. Questions may be framed in 
terms of wins or losses, opportunities or threats, positive or negative returns. A 
requirement for psychometric validity is that responses to events with equivalent 
outcomes should be invariant to the framing context.  
But there is strong evidence that question framing does influence responses. 
Alternative frames can produce complete reversals of risk attitude responses to an 
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identical problem of risky investment. The development of this evidence from its 
prospect theory origins can be traced in Kahneman (2003, 1998, 1999, 1979) and 
Tversky (1992, 1986, 1981). Financial planners need to be aware of framing effects 
and associated issues when assessing the attitudes of their clients to investment risk. 
Ignoring these effects can lead to completely inaccurate assessments, invalid 
interpretations and inappropriate advice on asset allocation and portfolio selection.     
This paper examines the nature of framing effects on the validity of risk attitude 
responses and assessments within the context of advice and recommendations on asset 
allocation and portfolio selection. We argue that current practices and techniques are 
often inadequate to the legislative objectives. They often contravene or ignore 
principles of behavioral finance and personal psychology. In particular, they disregard 
the effect of ‘framing’ on assessment validity.  
The purpose of this analysis is to show that ignoring such behavioral anomalies 
as question framing may invalidate responses and call into question any suggested 
portfolio selections that purport to conform to a ‘reasonable basis for advice’. The 
conclusions suggest that minimum industry standards of risk attitude assessment are 
urgently required to ensure some validity, relevance and standardization among 
current practices. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section two reviews the relevant legislative 
background to mandatory risk attitude assessment and lack of guidance on assessment 
procedures. Section three defines the concepts of ‘risk attitudes’ and ‘framing’ as used 
in risky investment decisions and identifies the types of framing in the literature. 
Sections four and five define and discuss two issues fundamental to assessment 
validity. The first issue concerns how to deal with framing bias in risk profile 
assessments. The second issue focuses on framing in the context of the role of risk 
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attitude assessments in asset allocation advice.  Section six suggests the need for 
minimum industry standards to help address these issues.  
 
2. Legislative Background to Risk Profiling 
The Financial Services Reform Act  (Commonwealth of Australia, 2001)  is part 
of a legislative regime designed to reform the Australian financial services industry. 
The Act provides for (i) single licensing framework for financial service providers; 
(ii) minimum standards of conduct for financial service providers dealing with retail 
clients; and (iii) uniform disclosure obligations for all financial advice provided to 
retail clients.   
Before giving financial advice or service, all licensees and their representatives 
must outline the services to be provided to the client in a Financial Services Guide. 
Advisors must have a suitable basis for giving that advice and must record advice 
details in a Statement of Advice to the client (Faludi, 2002).  
Any financial advice given to clients must be appropriate to the client’s 
objectives, financial situation and needs. The FP must make ‘reasonable’ enquiries of 
the client to establish these details. Financial advice is then only deemed appropriate 
and reasonable if it is made with due regard for ‘the client's objectives, financial 
situation and needs’ as a reasonable basis for the advice (Sec 945A). 
These ‘reasonable enquiries’ include assessment of a client’s reaction or attitude 
towards, and tolerance of, investment risk. The assessment obligation is repeated in 
both the Australian Financial Planning Association’s Code of Conduct (AFPA, 2003) 
to its members and the Australian Securities and Insurance Commission’s Policy 
Statement 175 (ASIC, 2003). The Statement outlines ASIC’s policy for administering 
sections of the Financial Services Reform Act concerning conduct and disclosure.  
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 The Policy Statement defines a client’s relevant personal circumstances as 
including their:  
a. Tolerance to the risk of capital loss, especially where this is a significant 
possibility if the advise is followed; and  
b. Tolerance of the risk that the advice (if followed) will not produce the 
expected benefits 1. 
Under the FSR Act, a ‘client’s best interest’ includes psychological comfort and 
well-being as well as economic optimization of portfolio returns. Financial planners 
must pay due attention to a client’s beliefs, expectations and attitudes as an integral 
part of ‘best interests’.  
While a strict interpretation of PS 175 defines risk tolerance in terms of capital 
loss, the concept more generally includes both return volatility and absolute capital 
loss tolerance. The FPA adopted this latter interpretation, commenting that PS175 
(ASIC, 2003) was not expansive enough about the nature of client related enquiries 
about risk attitudes, especially in light of the associated investor risks.   
But neither the Act nor PS175 lay down minimum requirements for risk attitude 
assessments or define standard procedures for dealing with various behavioral 
anomalies that complicate the risk assessment process by creating response effects 
that significantly influence the validity, accuracy and consistency of risk attitude 
ratings. So what are these ‘risk attitudes’ that Financial Advisors must assess? 
2.1 Behavioral Dimension of investment  
Markowitz portfolio theory may establish a deterministic model for optimal 
asset and portfolio allocation. But it does so under a highly unrealistic set of 
behavioral assumptions. For each individual client, investment decision making is 
                                                 
1 One item not included as yet is tolerance to levels of fees and charges by various strata of managers 
within the investment industry. 
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based as much on perceptions, attitudes, belief and experience as on economic 
criteria. (Antonides & Van Der Sar, 1990) stress that: 
“Individual investment decision making can be seen as the outcome of the 
confrontation between expectations and preferences, given the restrictions imposed by the 
budget and the market. Our information and beliefs determine the possible outcomes foreseen 
and their subjective probabilities, and our wants or desires determine the values or utilities of 
the possible outcomes…. After all, the perception of economic phenomena is governed 
by psychological factors”  
 
In a limited way, the AFSR recognises this conjunction of economic and 
psychological aspects in a client’s investment decision making.  The requirement for 
risk profiling is essentially an exercise in attitudinal measurement that integrates 
behavioral dimensions into conventional financial models by allowing for the 
subjectivity of perception. Valid, reliable measurement requires conformity to 
established psychometric principles of attitudinal measurement and control for 
behavioral anomalies that may bias assessment. 
Callan and Johnson (2002) have begun the call for minimum standards of 
process conformity with basic psychometric principles in order to ensure the required 
qualities of assessment outcomes such as internal validity and reliability. But the need 
to control for anomalies such as framing has not been addressed directly. 
Data is lacking about the how Australian financial planners current assess a 
client’s risk attitudes or tolerance. Most evidence is either anecdotal, from the popular 
press, industry sources or reflective experience (see, for instance, (Elsayed & Martin, 
1998); (Davey, 2000) 2. This evidence indicates that few, if any, approaches are based 
                                                 
2 In 2003, 1998 and 1995 a survey on the quality of advice by financial planners 
was jointly conducted by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and 
the Australian Consumers Association, but no reference is made to risk profiling or risk 
attitude assessment techniques {(ASIC, February 2003)ASIC, 2003}. A forthcoming 
survey of the financial services industry commissioned by the AFPA through the 
University of RMIT may include some information on current practice (see AFPA 




on psychometrically defensible processes either in terms of behavioral data collection 
principles or attitudinal measurement requirements (Callan and Johnson, 2002).   
An already existing trend is for large financial service franchising companies to 
develop standardized risk attitude assessment processes for distribution among their 
franchise holders. There are also an expanding number of software based risk attitude 
or risk preference assessment systems. While the advent of these programs reflects the 
inadequate state of current practices, there is, as yet, no comparative survey of their 
psychometric and construction validity 3. One exception is a software profiler by the 
firm ProQuest. This firm, now Finametrica, submitted their software profiler to 
psychometric validity tests with the University of New South Wales in 1999 with 
positive results (ProQuest, 1999). 
But there is considerable evidence of dissatisfaction from industry oversight 
bodies about both the processes of risk attitude assessment and the use of those 
assessments. The criticisms focus on (i) the lack of standardization of risk profiling 
approaches/techniques and (ii) the validity of approaches that use assessed risk 
attitudes to match and selected classes of investment portfolios categorized on their 
risk-return profiles. In 2003, a voluntary committee of the Financial Planning 
Association of Australia reached a consensus on a risk profiling definition but also 
‘… rejected processes of choosing investments based on whether investors were risk 
sensitive or risk tolerant’ (Spits, 2003). 
3. Risk Attitudes 
                                                 
3 Some vendors have submitted their product to psychometric testing. For instances, Pro-quest (now 
FinaMetrica) submitted their software to the University of New South Wales Psychology unit for 
testing (ProQuest, 1999).   . 
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The concept of ‘risk attitude’ has proved easier to measure than define. Saucier and 
Gerard  (2000) note the ambiguity and lack of consensus definition in the 
psychological literature since it first appeared. But they do identify recurrent themes 
such as diverse dimensions (opinions, beliefs and values) of evaluations (like, dislike, 
preference) about “objects” that imply alternative ideas of what is desirable (Saucier, 
2000) . As applied in investment decisions, ‘attitude’ refers to the tendency to 
evaluate a person or a thing or idea either favorably or unfavorably. Fishbein and 
Ajzen (1975) describe attitudes as: 
"Learned, relatively enduring predispositions to respond in consistently favorable or 
unfavorable ways to certain people, groups, ideas or situations."  
This definition emphasizes the developing nature of attitudes towards risky 
investments as a system of beliefs learnt over long periods of time, their consequent 
enduring nature and the involvement of feeling, beliefs and actions. Attitudes 
predispose people to behave (respond) in certain consistent ways, especially in 
evaluative terms. They may also play a positive facilitating role in memory-based 
decision making by providing a quick alternative means of evaluating choice options 
(Sanbonmatsu, and Fazio, 1990).  
Generic risk tolerances are only one element in the compromise between 
preferences and expectations. How attitudes then condition decision behavior is an 
entirely separate question. A client may bring different, often opposite reverse risk 
tolerances to bear on their actual investment decisions depending on the decision 
nature and context. Generic attitudes towards investment risk are not necessarily 
effective predictors of actual decision-making behavior in relation to different classes 
of investment decisions. 
3.1 Investment Risk 
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The concept of ‘investment risk’ refers to the possibility of capital loss and/or the 
volatility of returns on an investment if the financial advice is followed. The classical 
expression of investment decision-making under uncertainty defines a person’s risk 
attitude as their preference between a gamble and a certain pay-off. 
“…risk attitude indicates one’s preference between a gamble and the expected value 
of that gamble. Risk aversion means that one prefers the expected value, while risk 
seeking implies that one prefers the gamble. The definition of risk aversion, however, 
does not reveal why one prefers the certain amount.” ((Chapman, 1997) 
Studies into investment risk tolerance or risk attitudes are classical based on the 
preferences exhibited between a gamble and the (certain) expected value of that 
gamble under various contexts and levels of investment risk. Although risk attitude 
scales are essentially continuous (see diagram 1), financial planners generally assess 
risk preferences only in terms of broad categories. The spectrum is typically divided 
into three broad categories of ‘risk averse’ ‘risk neutral’ and ‘risk seeking’ preference 
rankings. 
The implicit assumption here is that financial advice on portfolio selection and 
asset allocation must be consistent with the client’s expressed attitude towards or 
tolerance of the probability and size of capital loss and degree of volatility of 
investment return.  Within these parameters, valid rankings require that category 
assignment is consistent with client attitudes. For instance, a valid assessment of a 
client as ‘risk averse’ should be accurate, repeatable and meaningful. That is, a risk 
averse profile should be (I) consistent with the client’s attitudes, (ii) invariants under 
repetition for questions of identical outcomes, and (iii) have appropriate separation 
value in an investment sense.  
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However, there are several behavioral factors that appear to violate these rules 
and invalidate categorization of clients risk attitude profiles. The issue of question 
Framing is such a problem. We now examine the dynamics of framing effects on 
response validity. 
3.2 Framing Defined 
Kahneman and Tversky (Daniel Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1986) first defined framing in its broad sense as the frame of reference 
used by a decision maker when making decisions. A ‘frame’ defines the decision 
maker’s conceptions as to the nature of ‘the acts, outcomes and contingencies 
associated with a particular choice’ (p. 453). (A. Kuhberger, 1998) defines ‘framing’ 
as an subjective, internal process determined by the situation’s contextual and 
individual factors.  
   (Evensky, 1997) emphasizes the uniqueness of individual conceptual schema. 
Each decision maker constructs their own subjective conceptions about the decision 
task derived from their own reality which then forms their own unique frame of 
reference.  
 Subsequently, ‘framing’ was used to refer to the manner in which a problem or 
issue is presented to the decision maker when determining their attitude towards risk. 
The ‘semantic manipulation of a problem so as to re-describe exactly the same 
situation.’  (A. Kuhberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & Perner, 2002)   
The classic approach to risk attitude assessment presents an investment decision 
with two options - a dollar outcome that is certain and an equivalent gamble with 
known probabilities. Risk attitude is reflected in the respondent’s choice of option 
Preference for the certain outcome reflects risk aversion. Preference for the gamble 
reflects risk seeking. Indifference between options represents risk neutrality. Intrinsic 
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factors such as investment size, levels of initial wealth, pay-off probabilities may be 
varied to reveal risk attitude patterns and sensitivity to conditioning and contextual 
factors. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) first formalized the notion that how attitudes are 
used in decision making is also influenced by how a particular investment decision is 
formulated or ‘framed’ in the strict sense (see also Tversky, 1986, 1981, 1992). A 
large body of empirical evidence now supports the proposition that the ‘framing’ of a 
choice problem can reverse risk attitudes, depending on whether the problem is 
framed in a positive or negative way. Kuhberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck and Perner 
(2002) provide a synthesis of this empirical evidence. When a decision involving 
financial uncertainty is framed in a positive light (e.g. In terms of gains) clients are 
less willing to take risks than if exactly the same pay-off situation is presented in 
terms of potential losses. Positive framing (gains, winning, opportunity) induces risk 
aversion, while negative framing (potential losses, losing or threat) of the same 
problem with equivalent pay-offs produces risk seeking attitudes.  
This attitude reversal means that the form of question presentation may 
condition the response. Two financial advisors may elicit completely contrary risk 
attitudes from a client by presenting a problem in two opposing ‘frames’ even though 
the choices have exactly equivalent pay-offs.  
3.3 Framing effect on responses and rationality  
A risky investment choice problem may have identical economic pay-offs, but 
may elicit contradictory responses from a client depending on how the problem is 
framed. In describing investors’ choice, (D. Kahneman & Riepe, 1998) assert that the 
objects of attitudes and evaluations of them are not objective facts but mental 
representations.  Although the choice problem may appear objectively defined this is 
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a false interpretation. Any choice issue is inherently contextual and can only be 
viewed through the lens of individual subject interpretation. Individual responses to 
uncertainty pay-off situations are formed from subjective evaluations that are strongly 
influenced by attitudes. So contradictory decision choices induced by framing in 
identical pay-off situations, while economically confounding, may be quite consistent 
to the individual making them. In mental accounting terms, the pay-offs for that 
decision may be asymmetrical depending on whether they are framed as losses or 
gains. Losses may weigh more heavily than the utility or satisfaction from equivalent 
gains. 
3.4 Evidence contrary to framing effects 
Not all studies support the framing effect conclusions. (Mandel D.R, 2001) 
reexamined the assumptions underlying the classic Asian disease problem used by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) to illustrate gain-loss formulation effects. {Mandel, 
2001) argues that their reported framing effects may have been due ambiguity and 
descriptor factors in the problem presentation. First for the decision maker, the 
outcome ambiguity attached to a sure outcome is much less than the ambiguity 
attached to a risky outcome prospect. Second, there are two distinct types of 
manipulations that get entangled in the alternative problem description. The first how 
the outcomes are described – positive versus negative presentations. The second 
manipulation relates to the descriptors used to convey the relevant expected outcomes 
(lives saved/not saved versus lives lost/not lost). {Mandel, 2001) found that 
eliminating these confounding effects from the presentation of a formally equivalent 
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problem resulted in no significant predictive effect of either descriptor or outcomes 
frames on choice 4.  
3.5 Benchmarking framing effects 
Framing effects in the classic Kahneman and Tversky context are inherently 
comparative. Individual responses to an investment choice problem couched in 
positive terms are compared to the responses framed in negative terms. Comparative 
assessments are then made in terms of sign changes (direction – risk averse versus 
risk tolerant) and magnitude changes (how much more or less risk tolerant) of attitude 
implied in these responses.  
While this “sign reversal effect” is well evidenced in empirical studies, there is 
less agreement about the size of the reversal effect. Druckman (2001) reports varying 
success among replication studies, for instance, Bless et al, 1998;  Fagley and Miller, 
1990; Miller and Fagley, 1991; Kuhberger, 1995; 1998. For a review of evidence see 
Levin et al, 199. 
Druckman (2001) distinguishes two approaches towards the comparative 
analysis of framing effects on risk attitude assessment. The first approach is a 
unidirectional effect or choice shift. The second is bi-directional effect or choice 
reversal. The first approach compares the percentage of participants choosing the risk 
averse alternative (risk seeking) in the gains format with those choosing the risk 
averse alternative in the losses format. A significant difference indicates a ‘framing’ 
effect. The standard of comparison in this approach ‘reveals just how different 
preferences can be when one frame is used instead of another (objectively identical) 
frame.’ (Druckman, 2001, p. 94).  
                                                 
4 A marginally significant framing effect was obtained when the signs for the two framing 
manipulations were either either positive or negative. 
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The second or bi-directional approach due to Wang (1966) uses a risk neutral 50 
percent of participants standard of comparison to establish if risk-averse choices 
dominate for the gains format (significantly greater than 50 percent) and risk seeking 
choices dominate for the losses format. A framing effect occurs if significantly greater 
than 50 percent of participants choose the risk-averse option under the ‘gains’ format 
and significantly fewer than 50 percent choose the risk-averse option under the ‘loss’ 
format. This approach has the advantage of showing whether alternative frames cause 
respondents to opt for opposite alternatives. ‘Identifying such a majority reversal in 
preference can be important for those interested in if different frames can generate 
majority support for one alternative instead of another’. (p. 94).  
Druckman (2001) points out that each approach reveals particular insights into 
framing effects. The unidirectional approach reveals the relative impact of alternative 
frames on preferences while the bi-directional approach reveals the occurrence of a 
majority preference reversal. However, the two approaches may give contrary results 
about the existence and strength of attitude shifts under framing effects.  
3.6 Frame-free Response Bench-mark 
More importantly, neither approach gives any insight into the effect of framing 
on latent attitudes or frame-free preferences. In real-world FP interviews, the 
respondent may experience only one frame in the self-report process that may or may 
not, shift their latent risk attitudes or preferences. Evaluating the effect of framing on 
frame-free attitudes requires the measurement of prior risk preferences. But even then, 
Wang (1996) points out that a general risk attitude propensity measure may be 
inappropriate since attitudes vary considerable across specific problem domains. 
The notion of frame-free response benchmarks brought a distinction between 
imposed and subjective frames.  (Elliott & Archibald, 1989) pointed out that studies 
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on framing effects since Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) original prospect theory 
article extended analysis within an imposed frames context. They studied the 
subjective frames used by respondents in choice situations to see whether subjective 
framing yields the same systematically different choices observed when using 
imposed frames. When comparing the predictive power of frames with that of 
knowledge of risk preferences, they found a clear relationship between actual decision 
choices and framing. But they found no relationship between choice behavior and 
attitudes towards risk. 
This distinction between risk attitudes, risk preferences and actual choice 
behavior has yielded interesting results. Several studies indicate that there is no clear 
relationship between an individual’s actual choice behavior and either risk preferences 
or risk attitudes as assessed by financial planners. So assessment of risk attitude or 
risk preferences is, at best, an uncertain guide to an individual’s actual behavior when 
making investment decisions under uncertainty.  
3.7 Attitudes and Decisions 
A note of caution is needed on the often substantive differences between a 
client’s attitudes, beliefs and opinions on the one hand and actual investment behavior 
or choices on the other. Although risk attitudes may indicate preferences and 
tolerances of investment risk, they can be poor predictors of a client’s actual decision 
behavior. (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998) affirm that the literature has been mixed 
as to how alternative framing of information in positive or negative terms actually 
affects judgments and decisions.  
Studies of factors determining risk preferences have also yielded interesting 
framing effect results. The object of framing effects may relate to the size of 
probabilities, the type and size of pay-offs or other framing conditions. (Anton 
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Kuhberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & Perner, 1999) distinguished size of probabilities 
and pay-offs attached to the risky outcome option as potential factors affecting risk 
attitudes. In line with existing formal theories such as prospect theory, cumulative 
prospect theory, venture theory, and Markowitz's utility theory, results confirmed an 
association between risk preferences and the size of payoffs, the probability levels, 
and the type of good at stake (money/property versus human lives).  
In general, risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses increases with 
increased dollar payoffs and with higher probability levels for the gambling option. 
But contrary to the predictions of these theories, it was not the size of probabilities or 
payoffs, but the framing condition itself, that explains most of variance in attitudes. 
{Kuhberger et al, 1999) concluded that the essence of framing could not be described 
by any linear combination of predictors.  
The size of effects of different framing perspectives on attitude reversal has also 
been studied. (Highhouse & Yuce, 1996) conclude that different framing perspectives 
produce different degrees of attitude reversal. They distinguished a ‘threat and 
opportunity’ perspective from a ‘loss and gain’ perspective. The risky alternative was 
perceived as an opportunity in the ‘loss’ domain, but as a threat in the ‘gain’ domain. 
But the two perspectives were distinguishable in their framing effects. The framing of 
a problem in a ‘threat’ versus ‘opportunities’ manner intensified the attitude reversal 
relative to a ‘loss/gain’ perspective. The former frame induced greater risk taking for 
opportunity-framed problems (loss) and increased risk averse for threat-framed 
problems (gain). We conclude that threat and opportunity perceptions are theoretically 





4. Effect of Framing on risk attitude assessment validity 
The forgoing review indicates the pervasiveness and robustness of the attitude 
reversal effect of framing in attitude assessment procedures. Two FPs may elicit 
contrary risk attitudes from a client by presenting a problem in two opposing ‘frames’, 
even though the choices have exactly equivalent pay-offs.  
Two issues arise on the question of how to deal with, or allow for, the effect of 
framing on attitude profiling. The first issue relates to the quality of assessment. The 
second to how these assessments are then used as a basis for investment advice and 
decision-making by the financial planner. Current practices by financial planners raise 
serious criticisms on both counts in relation to the legal requirement to ‘act in the 
client’s best interests’. 
(Callan & Johnson, 2002) see risk tolerance as a complex attitude that requires 
the use of a sophisticated and complete assessment process. The psychometric aspect 
of attitude assessment concerns measurement qualities that include internal validity, 
comparability, replication and accuracy.  They argue for systematically developed 
measures of risk tolerance with established test norms as a basis for looking at 
acceptable investments appropriate to the client’s level of risk tolerance. 
Psychometrically validated measurement processes then allow the financial planner to 
compare the client’s level of risk tolerance with others completing the same profiling 
procedure.   
But there is a second issue, quite apart from the measurement issue, that 
concerns the impact of other behavioral factors, such as framing, on the role of 
attitudes in actual decision behavior.  How we deal with ‘framing effects’ in the risk 
assessment process depends our view of how framing impacts on investment decision 
choices. One alternative is to treat the framing effect as an intrinsic characteristic of 
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client attitudes in the sense that a client adopts a particular ‘frame’ of reference when 
making identifiable types of financial decisions. For instance, a client may 
consistently adopt a “loss” frame of reference or heuristic when dealing with long 
term life-time savings decisions such as superannuation. But the same client may a 
client may adopt a “profit” or “winning” type of decision frame as a consistent 
heuristic with less significant, short-term investment decisions. This ‘consistent 
heuristic’ approach focuses on identification of the heuristic framing perspective each 
client adopts for specific investment decisions. The financial planner would then use 
that framing perspective in the self-report questioning process to construct a risk 
attitude profile appropriate for particular types of investment decisions.  
A second alternative is to concentrate on the extent of framing effect deviations 
away from a ‘frame-free’ benchmark. Framing bias is established by benchmarking 
self-report responses against a ‘frame-neutral’ benchmark of questions. One such 
approach is the ‘combination format’ of Levin, Johnson and Davis (1987) and 
(Druckman, 2001) 5. They suggest the concept of a frame-neutral benchmark to 
measure and eliminate framing effects - benchmark that contains both positively and 
negatively framing for each question. 
If the concept of ‘frame free’ attitudes is valid, then this standard of comparison 
provides a way to evaluate the impact of a frame on unadulterated preferences. That 
is, preferences unaffected by a particular frame. As with other attitude scales, the 
measurement process involves standardizing a set of questions on a frame-free 
benchmark for attitudes and then observing the shifts in attitude as a result of the 
component frames. 
 
                                                 
5 See also Kuhberger 1995. 
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5. Risk attitude assessment and asset allocation advice 
Callan and Johnson (2002) see client risk attitude or tolerance profiling as an 
attempt to bring psychological factors to bear on the issue of economic optimality. In 
terms of asset allocation advice, the purpose of risk profiling is to provide an accurate 
assessment of a client’s risk profile that will enable the adviser: 
“to develop a tailored financial plan that better reflects the client’s perception of 
the acceptable trade-off between risk and the compensation required for bearing risk. 
By making the client’s risk tolerance explicit and understandable, the planner is able 
to help the client identify any mismatch between psychological and financial needs, 
then work with the client to make any trade-offs that might be required.” (p. 133). 
 
5.1 Portfolio Pickers 
The second area of criticism over current risk profiling practice is the use of 
profiling as a disguised form of ‘portfolio picker’. Although this issue is distinct from 
framing considerations, the use of risk profiling by the financial advisor will influence 
how framing can adversely affect a client through inappropriate investment asset 
allocations or choices. The major use of risk profiling is to map a client’s needs and 
preferences into investment asset allocation advice or recommendations. But current 
practices often merely uses risk profiling as a poorly disguised one step technique for 
picking one of a pre-classified range of portfolios that are supposed to reflect the 
client’s risk attitudes, investment preference and requirements. 
This form of profiling is particularly prevalent in franchise operations. Many 
large banking and insurance companies run financial planning divisions through 
geographical agencies or franchises. The parent company will construct standardized 
portfolios categorized in risk-return terms as either ‘conservative’, ‘balanced’ or 
‘growth’ in their orientation. Licensed agents or franchisees will then either formally 
or informally collect verbal, written response and documentary evidence from the 
client as to their broad risk attitude profile. The profile is then matched to a 
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standardized portfolio category that will then be offered to the client by the agent or 
franchisee.  
Smaller financial planners who operate independently will usually make their 
recommendations based on similar classifications of portfolios by fund managers. 
Asset allocation to tailor a portfolio to an individual client’s attitudes, preferences and 
capacity then becomes a matter of blending a mix of these portfolios in each of the 
asset classes.  
Proquest (2001) describes this portfolio picking as a single step procedure in 
which scored questionnaires about a client’s age, experience, attitudes to risk, and 
time horizon are used to select one of a range of "profiles". Each risk profile is linked 
with one of a limited number of pre-constructed asset allocation portfolios. 
ProQuest (2001) identify five conceptual flaws that negate the validity and 
appropriateness to the client of these portfolio picking procedures. 
1. They ignore principles of test construction 
2. Situational questions preclude assessment of risk tolerance per se. 
3. No assessment of the return required to meet the client’s goals 
4. No identification of any mis-match between the client’s risk tolerance and 
the inherent risk in the portfolio return which may negate the 
appropriateness of the chosen asset allocation. 
5. No consideration of any alternative portfolios if a mis-match between the 
inherent risk and risk tolerance occurs.  
The major point here is that adverse framing effects are likely to be compounded 





6. Framing effects and Industry Standards 
Callan and Johnson stress the need for a high internal validity and reliability in 
risk attitude assessment processes. Risk tolerance or attitude scores require 
completeness, accuracy consistency and relevance. Lack of these measurement 
qualities compromises assessment reliability and comparability and may lead to 
inappropriate investment advice or recommended investment choices.  
 
 
6.1 Internal decision frames 
However, even more fundamental problems associated with the psychology of 
investment behavior may pre-empt measurement issues. Both risk attitudes and risk 
assessment processes are essentially context dependent. Just as externally imposed 
frames of reference may alter a client’s risk attitude, so a client’s own framing of 
decisions may affect the degree of investment risk they will tolerate for alternative 
sets of investment decisions. Or indeed whether they reverse attitudes between classes 
of investment decisions.  
The attitude a client adopts towards a particular investment decision or class of 
investment decisions may well depend on how the client mentally constructs or 
‘frames’ those decisions. Indeed a client may hold what appear to be mutually 
contradictory attitudes and decision making heuristics towards different types of 
investment choices. A client who is risk assertive when deciding on short-term 
investments using windfall capital may be considerably more risk averse when 
allocating life savings to long term investments such as superannuation investments 
that will determine levels of retirement income. 
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A change of frame reference may create reversals in risk attitudes. If the 
financial planner believes that the client consistently adopts a particular ‘frame’ when 
making investment decisions then the frames used in the question/response process 
should conform to that heuristic. Alternatively, where there is no evidence of such 
consistency, then an attempt may be required to get at the underlying ‘frame-free’ risk 




6.2  Industry standards? 
The Financial Services Reform Act is a first step in requiring financial advisors 
to take serious account of their client’s beliefs and attitudes when giving investment 
advice. But the Act’s silence on risk attitude assessment requirements is problematic 
for the financial services industry.  Presumably, financial planners are under onus of 
proof to demonstrate the legitimacy of their ‘reasonable enquiries’ process and 
attitude/tolerance assessments. Damage suits for large potential losses based on 
inappropriate advice or decisions may be hard to defend if a ‘reasonable person’ test 
indicates that the professional financial planner should have known about framing 
effects or had a duty of care to ensure process compliance with basic psychometric 
principles.  
The industry may need to assist its members to comply with the Act by 
developing industry standards for risk attitude/tolerance assessment processes. The 
complexity of the issues enhances the case for industry guidance to members. There is 
an urgent need for a structured approach to development of industry standards on 
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process requirements for concept valence, minimum compliance with psychometric 
principles and control of response conditioning factors.  
This urgency is enhanced by the upsurge of software based risk tolerance 
profilers and risk attitude assessors which have the capacity to embed framing effects 
across whole firms and groups of franchises if they are not made to conform to 
minimum industry standards. Psychometric certification is significant. But it is not the 
only, or indeed the most important, issue. A software profiler can be psychometrically 
valid in terms of attitude measurement scales but still be both conceptually unsound 
and practically dangerous if it ignores behavioral considerations such as decision 
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